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Peter J. Hammond t
Richard Posner's latest book, The Economics of Justice,' is unusually
ambitious. But then ambitious books such as this have a way of turning
out to be the most interesting, instructive and enduring.
The book is essentially an elaboration of some important points and
ideas that are touched on in Posner's earlier textbook Economic Analysis
of Law.2 Each chapter after the first is based upon a previously published
article (or, in one case, a chapter from Economic Analysis of Law). The
earlier works have been extensively revised, however, reflecting a serious
effort to keep up to date with the relevant literature, and to relate the
various chapters to each other and to the unifying theme of the book.
This theme is the same as that of Economic Analysis of Law-namely,
that economic principles should be used to analyze and to explain legal
rules and institutions and even the outcomes of important court cases. The
theme is set out in the first chapter, "An Introduction to the Economics of
Nonmarket Behavior." Posner argues that the "economic" approach can
and should be used to analyze decisions other than simply narrow eco-
nomic ones concerning resource allocation.3 He ascribes the "modern revi-
val of interest in applying economics to nonmarket behavior"4 to Gary
Becker, who has certainly made a point of stepping into many areas
t Professor of Economics, Stanford University. I am grateful to Mitchell Polinsky, William Rog-
erson and Eytan Sheshinski for helpful suggestions.
1. R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981) [hereinafter cited by page number only].
2. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2nd ed. 1977).
3. See L. ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE (1932).
4. P. 2.
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where more orthodox economists have feared to tread. Becker, however, is
by no means alone in assuming that people "maximize" or "optimize" in
just about all of their decisions; there is a vast literature on the application
of game theory to social decisionmaking that is based on precisely this
postulate.' In fact, Becker's theory is distinguished mainly by its merce-
nary insistence on reducing virtually all human motivation to monetary
values.6 It would indeed prove convenient if we could measure the value of
virtually anything by a person's willingness to pay for it. This is the ap-
proach of Marshallian price theory, which is what really lies behind the
principle of what Posner calls "wealth maximization" or "economic effi-
ciency."' It is this principle that is followed almost entirely throughout his
earlier Economic Analysis of Law, and that has already been criticized by
a number of writers.8 The criticisms thus far, however, are less conclusive
than they could be. Thus, I shall offer a number of criticisms of my own,
and I shall consider briefly a version of utilitarianism other than the crude
Benthamite "greatest happiness" principle, which Posner apparently re-
gards as the main alternative to wealth maximization.
I. Utilitarianism and Wealth Maximization As Ethical Principles
Part I of the book, entitled "Justice and Efficiency," starts by advancing
wealth maximization or efficiency as an ethical principle and distinguish-
ing it from utilitarianism. Chapter two contrasts Bentham, the founding
father of utilitarianism, with Blackstone whose Commentaries on the
Laws of England apparently did much to incite Bentham to pioneer the
analysis of law through an explicit ethical theory that did not unduly rely
on the power of a sovereign or the precepts of a religion. As Posner
frankly states: "The purpose of this chapter is mainly negative-to arouse
the reader's mistrust of utilitarianism by examining the thought of its
most thorough practitioner, Jeremy Bentham."9
5. "Game theory" was introduced, of course, in J. VON NEUMANN & 0. MORGENSTERN, THEORY
OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (1944). A by now somewhat dated sample of its applications
can be found in GAME THEORY AND RELATED APPROACHES TO SOCIAL BEHAVIOR (M. Shubik ed.
1964).
6. Becker's work also exhibits an unusual fondness (common to several members of the Economics
Department of the University of Chicago) for a "partial equilibrium" approach to price theory, which
traces its origins to Alfred Marshall in Cambridge during the last century. A. MARSHALL, THE PRIN-
CIPLES OF ECONOMICS (1890).
7. Posner distinguishes "economic efficiency" from Pareto efficiency and uses the term as many
economists do when they talk, very loosely, of "efficiency" as opposed to "equity." It should be noted,
however, that the concepts are identical with unrestricted lump-sum transfers, because an economic
allocation or state of affairs is efficient in either sense if and only if there is no reallocation (including
lump-sum transers) that makes everybody better off.
8. See, e.g., Keenan, Value Maximization and Welfare Theory, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 409-19
(1981); Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a Potentially Defective Product: A Guide to Posner's Eco-
nomic Analysis of Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1655-81 (1974).
9. P. 13.
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Chapter three, "Utilitarianism, Economics and Social Theory," is more
positive. It is based on an earlier article with almost the same title except
that the word "social" has significantly replaced "legal"."0 Of course, it is
true that Posner's very general ethical theory applies to all social choices,
not just to legal issues, so the change of title is appropriate. Posner suc-
cinctly states his thesis as follows: "The important question is whether
utilitarianism and economics are distinguishable. I believe they are and
that the economic norm I shall call 'wealth maximization' provides a
firmer basis for ethical theory than utilitarianism does."11
This is indeed a very serious philosophical claim whose implications are
by no means limited to legal philosophy or to economics. It is a claim that
this reviewer feels deserves very careful discussion. Although much ground
is covered both in chapter three, and in chapter four, "The Ethical and
Political Basis of Wealth Maximization," there is much more that re-
mains to be said.
First, it is important to understand what Posner means by the two ethi-
cal criteria of utilitarianism and wealth maximization. By utilitarianism,
which he also refers to as "Benthamism,"1 2 he has in mind the old happi-
ness-maximizing principle, which is the straw man that so many moral
philosophers have rightly knocked down. There are many reasons why
this kind of utilitarianism is unappealing, some of which I shall discuss in
Section IV.
Of course, wealth maximization is much more inflexible than utilitari-
anism. One of the criticisms of utilitarianism that Posner considers is the
indeterminacy of any measure of utility and the consequent vagueness of
its ethical recommendations. By contrast, wealth maximization appears
strikingly precise. It amounts to adding dollars in a way that Harberger,
especially, has rather forcefully advocated. 3 Such precision is bought at an
enormous price, however, and I shall argue in Section III that wealth
maximization often leads to conclusions that many of us would regard as
totally unethical. Moreover, the precision of wealth maximization is more
apparent than real because, as I argue next, it can easily lead to a logical
inconsistency.
10. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979).
11. P. 48.
12. Id.
13. More recently, however, Harberger has somewhat retracted this argument. See Harberger,
Three Basic Postulates for Applied Welfare Analysis: An Interpretive Essay, 9 J. ECON. LIT. 785-97
(1971); Harberger, On the Use of Distributional Weights in Social Cost Benefit Analysis, 86 J. POL.
ECON. S87-S120 (1978).
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II. The Inconsistency of Wealth Maximization
Posner explicitly discusses the Kaldor-Hicks compensation test, and
seems to believe it equivalent to his wealth maximization criterion.1 4 Yet
economists have known since 1941 that the Kaldor-Hicks criterion can
lead to an inconsistency in the sense that A is better than B and yet B is
better than A, except in very special cases first analyzed by Gorman."6
The problem is that when the test is used to assess policy changes that are
large enough to alter relative prices significantly, the wealth effects of the
price changes on different individuals need to be taken into account; this
the Kaldor-Hicks criterion does not do. Posner has not totally ignored this
problem, but he only alludes to it casually, 6 in discussing the wealth max-
imizing assignment of property rights and Dworkin's criticism." Posner
regards the problem as "exaggerated," noting for example that "[e]ven
moving from negligence to strict liability for automobile accidents would
not have so large an effect on prices as to prevent a comparison of the
total wealth of society before and after the change."'" This is actually an
empirical question that ought not to be disposed of so cavalierly in the
absence of any quantitative evidence.
Moreover, although Posner himself has not realized the distinction,
wealth maximization is actually a somewhat more subtle criterion than
the Kaldor-Hicks compensation test. Wealth maximization allows detailed
consideration of the distribution of income and of goods between people in
evaluating aggregate willingness to pay, whereas the compensation test
looks only at aggregates. Even so, except in the very special cases dis-
cussed by Gorman and by Roberts, 9 it is still impossible to avoid logical
contradictions in using the wealth-maximization criterion except by a par-
ticular device that is unlikely to be used in practice. Each individual's
willingness to pay must always be measured with reference to a fixed
status quo. This amounts to using a measure of "equivalent variation", to
use the standard economic terminology attributable to Sir John Hicks.20
14. Pp. 91-92.
15. See Scitovsky, A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics, 9 REV. ECON. STUD. 77-88
(1941). More recent discussions can be found in Keenan, Value Maximization and Welfare Theory,
10 J. LEGAL STUD. 409-419 (1981); Sen, The Welfare Basis of Real Income Comparisons: A Survey,
17 J. ECON. LIT. 23-25 (1979). For an elegant mathematical proof of when this kind of approach to
welfare theory is logically consistent, see Roberts, Price Independent Welfare Prescriptions, 13 J.
PUBLIC ECON. 277-97 (1980). The conditions for consistency were first given in Gorman, Community
Preference Fields, 22 ECONOMETRICA 63-80 (1953); Gorman, The Instransitivity of Certain Criteria
Used in Welfare Economics, 7 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 25-35 (1955).
16. See pp. 109-11.
17. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value? 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980).
18. P. 111.
19. See Gorman, supra note 10, Roberts, supra note 10.
20. See Chipman & Moore, Compensating Variation, Consumer's Surplus, and Welfare, 70 AM.
EcoN. REV. 933-49 (1980); Hause, The Theory of Welfare Cost Measurement, 83 J. POL. ECON.
1496
Vol. 91: 1493, 1982
Economics of Justice
But to remember what the status quo was, and what people were willing
to pay in the status quo, becomes harder and harder as more and more
changes are.made. This way of avoiding contradictions, therefore, is to-
tally impractical. Concomitantly, it is entirely evident that utilitarianism
always manages to avoid such contradictions because each individual's
utility is described by a fixed utility function that is then aggregated into a
fixed social welfare function for evaluating all possible outcomes. And
even if wealth maximization is made logically consistent by measuring
everything with reference to a fixed status quo, I believe it still faces in-
surmountable problems in becoming an acceptable ethical criterion.
III. The Boundary Problem
Among the problems associated with utilitarianism is the boundary
problem. Posner puts the problem with characteristic elegance and
starkness:
Whose happiness is to count in designing policies to maximize the
greatest happiness? Does the happiness of animals count?
Another boundary problem of utilitarianism concerns foreigners.
Should American policy be to maximize the happiness of Americans,
with foreigners' happiness given a zero weight? Or is a more ecu-
menical perspective required? And how about the unborn?2"
These are difficult problems for utilitarianism in any of its forms, and I
shall not even attempt to give an answer now beyond concurring with
Posner that: "it seems that if maximizing utility is to be taken seriously,
the broadest possible conception of the relevant population must be
used."2"
With regard to wealth maximization, Posner claims that the boundary
problem is much less serious,23 and that it has a clear resolution. As Pos-
ner puts it: "Animals count, but only insofar as they enhance wealth. The
optimal population of sheep is determined not by speculation on their ca-
pacity for contentment relative to people, but by the intersection of the
marginal product and marginal cost of keeping sheep. '24
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This is not too objectionable, although it is rather disturbing if we can
only justify measures to prevent cruelty to animals by people's willingness
to pay to have less cruelty, and can only justify protecting endangered
species on similar grounds. The real problem arises because wealth max-
imization treats sheep and humans on a more or less equal footing, since,
as Posner says:
Another implication of the wealth-maximization approach, however,
is that people who lack sufficient earning power to support even a
minimum decent standard of living are entitled to no say in the allo-
cation of resources unless they are part of the utility function of
someone who has wealth. This conclusion may seem to weight too
heavily the individual's particular endowment of capacities. If he
happens to be born feeble-minded and his net social product is nega-
tive, he would have no right to the means of support even though
there was nothing blameworthy in his inability to support himself.
This result grates on modern sensibilities, yet I see no escape from it
that is consistent with any of the major ethical systems."
Presumably utilitarianism is not to be regarded as a "major ethical sys-
tem," since it is surely more sensitive than this. So are most theories, such
as those of Harsanyi and Rawls,26 which are based on the notion of an
"original position." Indeed, later Posner goes out of his way to discuss
such original position theories:
But any theory of consent based on choice in the original position
is unsatisfactory, not only because of the well-known difficulties of
describing the preference functions of people in that position but also
because the original position approach opens the door to the claims
of the nonproductive. In the original position, no one knows whether
he has productive capabilities, so choices made in that position will
reflect some probability that the individual making the choice will
turn out to be an unproductive member of society .... "
Carried to its logical conclusion, then, wealth maximization requires
people who have outlived their usefulness and cannot persuade others to
look after them voluntarily to be slaughtered or left to die just like old
sheep who are no longer producing an adequate supply of good wool! At
least Posner is honest and consistent here.
When it comes to the boundary problem that arises from the conflict
25. Id.
26. See J. RAWIS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic
Ethics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. POL. ECON. 309-321 (1955).
27. P. 100.
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between maximizing the wealth of a nation and that of the whole world,
he provides only an evasive footnote that claims "most trade restrictions
hurt both parties to them."28 But there are many cases of monopoly power
where this is simply untrue. And what about all the conflicts that arise
when there is colonialism, or when the ownership of mineral rights on the
sea floor is considered? I conclude that, while wealth maximization pro-
vides a clear answer to the boundary problem in contrast to utilitarianism,
the clear answer provided is ethically unacceptable to most people I know.
IV. Utilitarianism, Hedonism and Moral Monsters
Another problem that Posner claims is better treated by wealth max-
imization than by utilitarianism is "moral monstrousness." He explains
two types of monstrosity-"the utilitarian's refusal to make moral distinc-
tions among types of pleasure""9 and "the utilitarian's readiness to sacri-
fice the innocent individual on the altar of social need. '30
The first type of monstrosity only arises because Posner only considers
a Benthamite if not a hedonistic type of utility. This is well illustrated in
the following claim:
The difference between utilitarian and economic morality, and the
source, I believe, of the "monstrousness" of the former, is that the
utilitarian, despite his professed concern with social welfare, must
logically ascribe value to all sorts of asocial traits, such as envy and
cruelty, because these are common sources of personal satisfaction
and hence of utility.
31
Of course, envy and cruelty are surely better described as "antisocial"
rather than merely "asocial" traits. Really, then, this goes to confirm my
view that Benthamite or hedonistic utilitarianism is ethically unaccept-
able. There are, however, other forms of utilitarianism that do not count
monstrous preferences, and disregard satisfactions derived from cruelty or
the lack of satisfaction that arises from envy.32 I shall discuss one in Sec-
tion V below.
The second type of monstrosity can be dealt with to some extent by
replacing simple act utilitarianism by a suitable form of rule utilitarian-
ism.3 3 However, I must agree that "any utilitarian objections to creating




32. For a recent survey of possible types of utilitarianism, see Brock, Recent Work in Utilitarian-
ism, 10 AM. PHIL. Q. 241-76 (1973).
33. For a good recent discussion of rule utilitarianism, see Harsanyi, Rule Utilitarianism and
Decision Theory, 11 ERKFNNTNIS 25-53 (1977); Harsanyi, Rule Utilitarianism, Rights, Obligations
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an exception to the murder laws for killers of obnoxious grandfathers
have no force at the level of personal morality once it is stipulated that the
murder will go undetected,"34 though the case would be even better if the
murder were also to go unsuspected.
How does wealth maximization deal with monstrosity?
In a thoroughgoing utilitarian system no budget constraint exists
to cramp the style of the utility monster. But in a system of wealth
maximization his activities are circumscribed by the limitations of his
wealth, and his victims are protected by the rights system, which
forces the monster to pay them whatever compensation they
demand. 5
This appears to deal relatively well with those of a monster's intended
human victims who happen to be able to exercise rights. An obnoxious
grandfather can be murdered only if he is first compensated enough to
make him willing to be a victim later. Mephistopheles' contract with
Faust was also wealth-increasing, no doubt. But what about cruelty to
animals or to young children? Must young children rely on the protection
of parents who may be callous and mercenary? Do animals have to rely
on being bought from monstrous owners by humane societies? These
questions raise the possibility that wealth maximization may not be the
answer to monstrosity either, and may even be less of an answer than a
refined form of utilitarianism.
V. Another Kind of Utilitarianism
I have argued that Benthamnite or hedonistic utilitarianism is an unnec-
essarily crude form of utilitarianism. It is incumbent on me to offer an
alternative, although space does not permit more than the briefest sketch
of the alternative I wish to propose, nor have I yet fully worked out the
details.
The first problem that a utilitarian faces is to determine what consti-
tutes "utility" for an individual. The second problem is that of making
interpersonal comparisons of individual utilities and aggregating them into
what economists call a measure of social welfare.
One of the better discussions of how to determine "utility" for an indi-
vidual is that of John Broome." As he observes:
If somebody selects one of the alternatives rather than the other,
and the Theory of Rational Behavior, 12 THEORY AND DECISION 115-33 (1980).
34. P. 57.
35. P. 82.
36. Broome, Choice and Value in Economics, 30 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 313-33 (1978).
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but has no good reason for doing so, then there is no reason to say
that it is the best alternative for him or her. To be more exact, the
choice needs to be based on good, self-interested reasons. They must
be self-interested, because if a person were to make a choice for a
reason which was not self-interested, then by considering the choice
alone we should not get a proper indication of this person's interest,
as opposed to the interests of other people.37
The evident difficulty here is how we are to determine what constitute
"good" and "self-interested" reasons for making choices. Clearly one
wants to use ethical criteria, which suggests using the Kantian principle of
universalizability that Hare especially has argued lies at the heart of all
ethical arguments.38 This in turn suggests defining the utility of a particu-
lar individual as that which the individual would wish a utilitarian moral
agent to maximize on his or her behalf, when the moral agent contem-
plates making choices for "good" reasons based upon the individual's per-
sonal interest. This is universalizable because it is presumably how any
moral agent wants his own personal interests to be treated, and we should
have a rule that is symmetrical regardless of who is the moral agent. It
should be remarked that "good" here should be taken to include moral
worthiness-at some risk of being circular-as well as practical considera-
tions such as full use of available information, sound judgment and com-
mon sense.
The second problem of interpersonal comparisons is one that even a
Benthamite utilitarian has to face, since the happiness of different people
(and animals) has to be compared and weighed. The problem seems to
have been of great concern to economists but not, oddly enough, to philos-
ophers. This may be because many philosophers have found so much in
utilitarianism to criticize even before they reach the problem of comparing
individuals' utilities, whereas most economists have been content to follow
the doctrine of "consumer sovereignty" whereby the preferences consum-
ers exert in the market are thought to correspond to their "utility"-a
doctrine that Broome and others have rightly called into question.
My own view is that we should concentrate more on constructing an
acceptable social welfare function than on the interpersonal comparisons
that are bound to be incorporated in that function at least implicitly. For
example, in constructing a function that represents our judgments con-
cerning the distribution of income, we should follow Atkinson's sugges-
tion39 and contemplate the trade-off between total income and inequality
37. Id. at 333.
38. R. HARE, THE LANGUAGE OF MORALS (1951); R. HARE, FREEDOM AND REASON (1963).
39. Atkinson, On the Measurement of Inequality, 2 J. ECON. THEORY 244-63 (1970).
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directly, rather than indirectly as we would if we started with interper-
sonal comparisons.
It is clear that this form of utilitarianism has very many subjective fea-
tures-probably even more than the crude Benthamite form. This should
come as no surprise, however, since ethics is inevitably subjective, despite
the attempts of many-including Posner-to rest it upon fairly secure em-
pirical foundations.
I suppose such subjectivity is especially disturbing to lawyers, who
would like to have verdicts based on "the facts of the case" as far as possi-
ble. Yet, ever since the time of David Hume, if not before, we have known
that such attempts to avoid subjectivity are more or less doomed to failure,
even if made by experts in legal ethics. Must the lesson be repeated over
and over again?
VI. Rights
Another difficulty with utilitarianism that Posner notices is how it can
easily disregard individual rights. As he writes, "if happiness can be in-
creased by treating people more like sheep, then rights are out the win-
dow." 0 I would prefer substituting the word "utility" or "welfare" for
happiness, but basically I agree with this statement. The conflict with
rights is one of the most powerful criticisms of utilitarianism, and has
been extensively discussed of late by philosophers, economists, political
theorists, and lawyers."' But is wealth maximization really any better in
respecting rights? After all, it is really no more than a special kind of
utilitarianism, in which "utility" is replaced by the specific measure
"wealth"-or, more specifically, the equivalent variation relative to some
fixed status quo, as discussed in Section II.
In a rather shallow sense, wealth maximization does respect rights
more than utilitarianism does, simply because everybody retains the right
to earn wealth and to spend it as he sees fit. But this leaves the destitute
with no effective rights whatsoever, as was noticed in connection with the
boundary problem. The old person who has become helpless and destitute
is not even entitled to self-respect, no matter how noble his or her past
labors may have been.
Posner, however, claims that wealth maximization determines how
rights should be allocated. As he puts it: "If transactions costs are positive
. . . the wealth maximization principle requires the initial vesting of
rights in those who are likely to value them most, so as to minimize trans-
40. P. 56.
41. See, e.g., Sen, The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, 78 J. POL. ECON. 152-157 (1970); R.
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978); J. RAWLS, supra note 26; UTILITARIANISM AND BE-
YOND (A. Sen & B. Williams eds. forthcoming).
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actions costs.""2
In a footnote here, he notices the "technical difficulty" that arises be-
cause of "the possibility that the initial assignment of rights may affect
prices and thereby make values derivative from the assignment of rights
rather than determinative of it,"'43 but he postpones discussion to the next
chapter. There he seeks to rebut some of Dworkin's criticisms of wealth
maximization 44-in particular, precisely this "problem of circularity in
my attempt to derive a system of rights from a goal of maximizing
wealth."4 He also attempts to show that Dworkin's example is unreason-
able. Dworkin's example is of a slave called Agatha who is owned by a
master called Sir George. Posner's discussion of the example concludes as
follows:
The point is that wealth maximization leads to a determinate so-
lution in the Agatha-Sir George case once it is assumed that she
could produce more if she were free than if she were a slave. Since
she would retain her freedom if given it from the first and would
purchase it if she began as Sir George's slave, the initial assignment
[of rights] does not determine the final assignment. Transactions
costs are therefore minimized by making her free in the first place. 6
I agree with Dworkin "that a theory that makes the moral value of
slavery depend on transactions costs is grotesque. 4 7 Nevertheless, such
emotive feelings apart, what happens if Agatha wants to be free not only
to produce more, but simply to be able to enjoy more leisure than if she
were a slave? Then she would be unable to earn enough to buy her free-
dom, and Posner's argument against her remaining a slave collapses. Pos-
ner justifies freeing only very industrious slaves, not pleasure-seeking
ones.
VII. Consequentialism
Another limitation that both utilitarianism and wealth maximization
share is their concentration on consequences. In fact, many of the criti-
cisms that philosophers make of utilitarianism, including those by Wil-
liams that Posner cites,48 are actually criticisms of the rather more general
ethical doctrine of consequentialism. Posner realizes this, and realizes that
42. P. 71.
43. Id.
44. Dworkin, supra note 11.
45. P. 109.
46. P. 110-11.
47. Id. at 211.
48. Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM FOR AND AGAINST (J. Smart & B.
Williams eds. 1967).
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wealth maximization is a special form of consequentialism, yet does noth-
ing to rebut the rather damaging criticisms of consequentialism that can
be made, especially in non-economic contexts.4 9 For example, one criticism
of consequentialism is that it devalues heroism. It does not lead us to ap-
plaud the person who against all the odds-indeed, regardless of the
odds-jumps into freezing water to try to help the drowning child and
risks drowning himself as well. In a legal context, this raises the question
of how much somebody who was demonstrably negligent in not ade-
quately fencing off a dangerous pond is liable to pay compensation not
only for the life of the child but also for that of an unsuccessful intended
rescuer. The principle of wealth maximization leads us to measure the
value of the intended rescuer's life as no more than what is consistent with
his willingness to attempt the rescue at great danger to himself. Of course,
the intended rescuer also valued the child's life, and this in principle
should be counted, but of what value is the life of a child to a dead man,
or to his widow, if the child was a complete stranger?
At this point, I feel I should summarize what has been said in the last
few sections. If one adopts a more flexible and appropriate form of utilita-
rianism than Benthamism, some of the most important problems disap-
pear. Moreover, wealth maximization, when it is forced-rather artifi-
cially-into a form in which it is logically consistent, is really no more
than a very specific but also very unappealing form of utilitarianism. As a
special form of utilitarianism, wealth maximization shares many of its de-
fects, including a disregard of all rights that are not property rights, and
an excessive regard for consequences rather than for the actions that led to
those consequences and for the motives that stimulated those actions.
VIII. Posner's Applications of Ethical Criteria
I have paid vastly disproportionate attention to the statement and de-
fense of the principle of wealth maximization in Part I of the book be-
cause Posner regards it as his fundamental theme, and because it merits
serious discussion as an ethical principle. In the little space that remains I
shall argue that, although Posner himself believes that wealth maximiza-
tion is the criterion that should be used consistently, he relies at least as
much on other more widely accepted ethical criteria.
Part II, on "The Origins of Justice," is essentially anthropological
where it is based upon fact rather than (as in chapter five, "The Homeric
Version of the Minimal State") on ancient Greek mythology. The connec-
49. P. 48 n.3.
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tion with economics is extremely tenuous; that with game theory may be
somewhat less so, as one might expect. Posner considers "primitive" socie-
ties in which the distinction between the less demanding criterion of
Pareto efficiency and the more demanding one of wealth maximization" is
probably just too subtle for us ever to identify which, if either, is really
being pursued. This is especially true if one uses an ex-ante version of the
Pareto criterion, as in Posner's principle of "consent,"'" because the mem-
bers of primitive communities are unlikely to have widely different inter-
ests. Nor do the arguments presented have the analytical detail that would
exploit the distinction between the two ethical criteria. The institutions
discussed-such as mutual insurance within a kinship group, the strict
liability concept in primitive legal systems, and retribution-all look as
though they could be justified by an appeal to the weaker criterion of
Pareto efficiency.
Part III of the book is concerned with privacy. It argues against privacy
as secrecy, rightly on the whole. In a society that consistently pursues
some ethical goal, making more information public is generally benefi-
cial. 2 An exception that Posner notes concerns inventions, where secrecy
is justified as providing an incentive to inventors. Yet such secrecy and the
associated patent laws often produce at least temporary monopolies that
are Pareto inefficient as well as not wealth maximizing. The optimal de-
gree of protection of inventors' rights is a difficult and delicate question
that economists are really just beginning to face properly.
Another kind of privacy that Posner discusses is seclusion-the right
not to have one's house searched without a warrant, for example. This is
perceived to be a right, however, and no attempt is made to justify seclu-
sion on wealth-maximizing grounds. Probably no such attempt could be
successful, either. Especially in a country that has experienced the likes of
Joseph McCarthy, privacy is indeed a valuable right, and one that should
not be restricted to those who can afford to pay for it. Privacy may, how-
ever, be inconsistent with wealth maximization if, for instance, it is
wealth-maximizing to use every possible means to track down a dangerous
50. Pareto efficiency is less restrictive than wealth maximization (where the latter is well de-
fined-see supra pp. 1496-97) unless unrestricted lump-sum transfers of wealth can take place
costlessly-cf, supra note 7. Such transfers are generally needed to convert a wealth-increasing change
into a Parcto-improving change, with everybody better off.
51. P. 94.
52. A number of economists have recently disputed this, and have argued that, at least in special
cases, extra public information could actually make everybody worse off by removing opportunities for
insurance that would exist in the absence of the extra information. See Hirshleifer, The PRivate and
Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561-74
(1971). For an assessment of Hirshleifer's argument, see Hammond, On Welfare Economics with
Incomplete Information and the Social Value of Public Information (Stanford University, Institute of
Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Economics Technical Report No. 332, 1981) (unpub-
lished paper on file with Yale Law Journal).
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criminal.
Nor do we find Posner using his criterion of wealth maximization con-
sistently in Part IV, on discrimination. He recognizes that racial discrimi-
nation may well be economically efficient or wealth-maximizing. Never-
theless, he is broadly sympathetic to legislation against discrimination. As
he writes:
Because blacks are an economic minority, the costs to them of the
whites' prejudice are proportionately greater than the costs to the
whites. This is not to say that discrimination is inefficient but that
discrimination has systematic redistributive effects that could be used
as the premise of a neutral, though not a wealth-maximizing, an-
tidiscrimination principle.53
and:
The fact that much racial discrimination may be efficient does not
mean that it is or should be lawful. It does suggest, however, that the
"balancing" approach sometimes used in constitutional cases might,
if honestly followed in racial cases, result in upholding many in-
stances of racial discrimination on efficiency grounds, even if distrib-
utive effects were also weighed in the balance. 4
So the argument against discrimination is redistributive. What Posner
fails to recognize, however, is that such a redistributive argument can also
justify reverse discrimination. Posner summarizes his views on this as
follows:
[I]n the case of discrimination against an economic minority, such
as the blacks in this country, a distributive argument is available.
The argument is that discrimination imposes proportionally greater
costs on the minority than on the discriminating majority. This dis-
tributive ground is not available, however, to justify reverse discrimi-
nation based simply on the threat of a minority group to impose
costs on the majQrity if they do not distribute wealth to it, over and
above the redistribution brought about by outlawing discrimination
against minorities. Nor have I been able to discover any other per-
suasive ground for justifying reverse discrimination."5
It is quite true that redistribution cannot really be justified solely on the
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sion of Blackstone and Bentham).16 But the absence of adequate reverse
discrimination equally "imposes proportionally greater costs on the minor-
ity" and so seems to be an equally valid distributive argument for reverse
discrimination. If distributive arguments can only be used to oppose dis-
crimination against poor minorities, with what can we oppose discrimina-
tion against poor majorities, such as occurs under South Africa's system of
apartheid?5 7 Having raised the possibility of using distributive arguments,
it seems that Posner is most reluctant to face up to their full implications.
Conclusion
Posner's The Economics of Justice is an interesting and lively book. Its
stated purpose is to expound and illustrate the principle of wealth max-
imization and its applications to law. This purpose could never be fully
accomplished because the principle itself is fatally flawed. As I have ar-
gued, it is logically inconsistent except in implausible special cases. It is
also ethically unacceptable to many of us. Posner's arguments for this
principle include an attack on what he sees as the alternative, which is
classical or Benthamite utilitarianism based on happiness. Improved ver-
sions of utilitarianism, however, are much more acceptable. Finally, I
have argued that in the applications he discusses, Posner in fact often uses
quite different and more widely accepted ethical criteria, such as Pareto
efficiency, rights, and egalitarian arguments for redistribution. In fact,
much of his advocacy is entirely sensible precisely because he departs from
rigid adherence to wealth maximization. Where he does not, his advocacy
is sometimes extremely suspect and heartless, as, for example, when peo-
ple who lack the means of self-support are considered.
The Economics of Justice is a book from which the thoughtful reader
can learn much-not least, about his or her own values. It will be much
discussed, as it deserves to be, and not only by lawyers.
56. P. 43.
57. Of course, apartheid is almost certainly not wealth-maximizing, but what if it were shown to
be, or modified to become so?
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Socratic Jurisprudence: The Province of
Legal Morality-Undetermined
Socrates and Legal Obligation by R.E. Allen. University of
Minnesota Press, 1980. Pp. 148, $17.95.
Thomas R. Kearnst
By focusing on points in legal theory, R.E. Allen's Socrates and Legal
Obligation' provides a distinctive and stimulating interpretation of Plato's
Apology and Crito. Often these two accounts-of Socrates' trial and of his
subsequent refusal to escape his execution-are read as posing a kind of
Socratic paradox in political obligation. Specifically, how can one pro-
claim, as Socrates did, a duty to one's god that surpasses allegiance to the
State and then, barely four weeks later, willingly submit, as Socrates also
did, to what one regards as one's own unjust conviction and wrongful
death? Professor Allen's very interesting thesis, part of it expressed only
sotto voce, is that the answer depends on certain specific aspects of the
nature of law, aspects that cannot be derived from any general analysis of
political obligation. By emphasizing jurisprudential issues, Professor Allen
masterfully identifies yet another domain of insight and invention in So-
cratic thought. It is one that should interest contemporary students of ju-
risprudence and that henceforth will require political theorists and others
who work with these materials to grapple with some long ignored points
about the nature of law and legal systems.
The present review concentrates on what Professor Allen alleges is the
central argument of the Crito, namely, an account of legal authority that
purports to show that Socrates' escape would be tantamount to destroying
the law of Athens. The review examines several interpretations of Profes-
sor Allen's analysis of this argument and concludes with one that Socrates
possibly endorsed-though, probably, he should not have. Whether Pro-
fessor Allen himself thinks the argument is a good one is not entirely
clear. In the final pages, the review focuses on Professor Allen's laments
regarding certain alleged failures of legality at Socrates' trial. Here there
t Department of Philosophy, Amherst College. I wish to thank my colleagues in Philosophy,
Professors de Vries, Epsicin, and Kennick, and Professor Kateb in Political Science, for reading, and
dissuading me from, a very different first draft. What appears here is entirely my own responsibility.
1. R. ALLEN, Socrates and Moral Obligation (1980) [hereinafter cited by page number only].
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is reason to think that the book's emphasis on jurisprudential issues con-
ceals some important philosophical points, especially the splendid irony
that the trial was the occasion of Socrates' final effort to revise Athens'
conception of piety.
I. The Argument of the Crito
Even supposing, as Socrates did, that in convicting him "the City did
[him] an injustice and didn't decide the case correctly, ' 2 there are many
reasons why he might have chosen to accept his fate and not escape. Some
of them are enumerated in the course of the dialogue and touch on such
disparate considerations as his age, his "big talk" at the trial to the effect
that he would rather die than disappoint his god, the fact that he would
be received with suspicion were he to go elsewhere, and so on. These,
surely, are reasons Socrates might have had for not escaping. But they do
not show that it would have been wrong for him to do so; they do not
show that he had a duty not to escape. Yet it appears that Socrates ac-
cepted an argument that he supposed entailed precisely that duty. Philo-
sophical interest in the Crito turns largely on this argument. What is it
and is it any good?
As readers may recall, the argument in question is conducted neither by
Socrates nor by Crito, but by the Laws, the laws of Athens personified.
Professor Allen reports that the appearance of this figure was much ad-
mired among contemporaries as an inspired literary device, but it is not
only that, as the author carefully notes.' Indirectly, it might be interpreted
as a statement in legal ontology, suggesting, perhaps, that "[sitatements
about a legal order cannot be analyzed without remainder into sets of
statements about individual human beings.. . . "'I On the other hand, one
can easily lose sight of the fact that the Laws are not really persons and
that their perspective is not the same as that of a citizen. Here, it seems, is
a source of great mischief, greater possibly than either Socrates or Profes-
sor Allen noticed.
Much of the Laws' speech recites the numerous things they have done
for Socrates: they have overseen his birth, nurture, and education; they
have given him an equal share in the goods of the State; they have offered
him, in his maturity, a real option to leave Athens if he chose to do so;
and they have governed, not by commands, but by rules that could be
changed or held in abeyance if shown to be unjust. Socrates chose to stay;
he raised a family in Athens; he did nothing to withdraw himself from the
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City's rightful rule. How is this collection of considerations to be under-
stood? Typically, each item has been cited as an independent reason-a
reason of debt, or gratitude, or estoppel, or agreement-in support of the
conclusion that Socrates had an inescapable obligation to obey the Laws.
Professor Allen's interpretation is strikingly different. He urges that
agreement is the fundamental or foundational component of the Laws'
argument.' The agreement in question-implied, of course-is the prom-
ise to abide by the law. The other things cited in the course of the Laws'
argument are simply evidence of and consideration for the agreement. But
this agreement, while fundamental to the Laws'.argument, is neither the
sole nor the most important component. What the agreement does is bring
Socrates within the Laws' jurisdiction; it explains why Socrates, but not
everyone (no Thessalian, for example) is subject to Athenian law. The
agreement determines what Professor Allen calls the Laws' scope,6 though
presumably there might be other ways of becoming a legal subject, by
being sold into Athenian slavery, for example, or by military capture. But
merely being a proper subject of Athenian law does not explain why one
should not escape what one believes is an unjust conviction. According to
Professor Allen's reading of the Laws' argument, what makes escaping
wrong, conclusively wrong, is the injury it would do the Laws.7
Astounding as it might seem at first, the injury contemplated here is the
Laws' destruction, or something tantamount to that, as far as it lay in
Socrates' power. The possibility of this injury depends on the foundational
agreement to abide by law, but the injury itself, the Laws' destruction, is
principally delictual in character, not contractual.8 The chief problem in
the dialogue is to understand why the Laws might think that Socrates'
escape would be tantamount to their destruction. If this point could be
made plausible, surely Socrates' fate would be sealed, for however unjust
his conviction might have been, it could not conceivably morally warrant
his destroying Athens and her laws.
This two-pronged interpretation of the Laws' argument, citing an
agreement and the threat of an enormous noncontractual injury, is
powerfully supported by the text. The Laws' first remarks refer to the
contemplated escape as an attempt to destroy them, thus signalling the
crucial claim of the argument." Subsequent passages revert to the tempo-
5. Pp. 75-76.
6. Pp. 86, 91, 94.
7. P. 76.
8. P. 85.
9. The full argument is as follows:
Tell us, Socrates, what you intend to do. Do you mean by this to undertake to destroy us?
To destroy, as far as in you lies, the Laws and the City as a whole? Or do you think a city can
any longer exist and not be overturned, in which legal judgments once rendered are without
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rally prior matter of the agreement and establish ample consideration for
Socrates' implied promise to abide by Athens' laws. That these materials
come after the point about destroying the Laws does not show that they
are somehow merely additive to the opening claim. Clearly, if the opening
claim can be made out, any additions would be entirely superfluous. The
fact that further points are made indicates, then, that they should be un-
derstood as support for the opening assertion and not as further indepen-
dent arguments as to why Socrates should not escape.
Professor Allen's interpretation has the considerable virtue of not
ascribing to Socrates a kind of moral rigorism as regards agreements. It is
true that Socrates held that agreements, provided they are just, should be
kept. 10 But this is compatible with being released from one's promise
when what would otherwise count as a breach is the only way to avoid
suffering a promisee's wrongdoing. It is also true that part of the Socratic
moral revolution was to reject retribution, the view that doing harm is the
proper response to harm done." But it should be possible to distinguish
retribution from an effort to avoid suffering a wrongful injury, even when
the latter inescapably involves the breach of a just agreement. It might
occur to someone to stand Professor Allen's argument on its head: perhaps
the topic of agreement follows the Laws' opening claim about their own
destruction because the agreement, or its breach, is itself supposed to ex-
plain the point about destruction. But this would also have to be ex-
plained since, without more said, it would follow that every petty theft,
involving as it does a breach of the agreement to abide by the law, would
be the moral equivalent of destroying the Laws. If this is right, every
violation of law should be a capital offense, if any is. But this is patently
absurd.
What reason is there to regard Socrates' breach in the seemingly hyster-
ical way that the Laws suggest? Professor Allen's answer comes in a very
condensed paragraph that is reproduced, almost verbatim, below. It cen-
ters on a certain understanding of judicial authority. In the opening
sentences of their speech, the Laws note explicitly that according to Athe-
nian law "judgments judicially rendered [are] authoritative. 1 2 With this
law in mind, Professor Allen proceeds to impute to the Laws the follow-
ing line of thought. For Socrates to escape he would have to deny the
force, but may be rendered unauthoritative by private citizens and so corrupted.
How are we to answer that, Crito, and questions like it? A good deal might be said, espe-
dally by an orator, in behalf of that law, now to be broken, which requires that judgments
judicially rendered be authoritative. Or are we to reply that the City did us an injustice and
didn't decide the case correctly. P. 123 (quoting PLATO, CRITO, line 50 (b-c)).
10. P. 122 (quoting PLATO, CRITO, line 49 (e)).
11. Pp. 70, 112.
12. P. 123 (quoting PLATO, CRITO, line 50 (b)).
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authority of his sentence. But its authority derives precisely from the fact
that it was rendered "according to law."" So, to deny it would be "to
deny authority to any sentence so rendered; but this is to deny authority to
law itself, since it is to deny authority to its application."14 And, the au-
thor concludes, since "the application of law is essential to the existence of
law, to act in breach of a given application is-by so much-destructive of
all law."' 5
The argumentation here is terse and needs to be unpacked, piece by
piece. First, the notions of legal authority and legal validity must be dis-
tinguished and clarified. Legal validity, Professor Allen notes, is "a specif-
ically legal concept,"' 6 but more, it has to do with identifying the specifi-
cally legal materials (or their sources) on which the several parts of the
legal order are authorized to operate. By contrast, legal authority "is a
moral concept which contains validity"' 7 as one element, and agreement
(presumably, the citizen's agreement to abide by the law) as the other. To
express the matter somewhat more fully than Professor Allen does, it ap-
pears that legal authority is really a three-placed relation that obtains be-
tween a law, a person, and a legal system, as follows: a given law, L", is
legally authoritative for a person, P, if and only if L1 is legally valid in
legal system LS., and P stands within the scope of LS.
This complexity in the structure of legal authority, apparently unno-
ticed by Professor Allen, has the embarrassing consequence that it is sim-
ply unintelligible to speak of a law being authoritative simpliciter;
whereas a law is either (legally) valid or not, relative to a given legal
system, a law is legally authoritative only with respect to a specific person
(relative to a specific legal system). What can it possibly mean, then, for
Athens to have a law that declares that judgments judicially rendered are
authoritative? If, as Professor Allen maintains, legal authority is a matter
of scope (that is, of agreement, and in this regard a moral matter) and a
matter of (legal) validity, then a law's authority will in every case depend
on the specific person to whom it is applied and on whether that person is
or is not within the law's scope. But plainly this is not a matter that can
be decided in advance, as a matter of law, since in part, anyway, it is a
contingent matter of fact." Moreover, what can it mean for the Laws to
contend, as they do, that were Socrates to escape, the precise law he would






18. It is also a moral matter, as Professor Allen insists, see p. 110, but the law's declara-
tions regarding the moral status of its own pronouncements have no moral force whatever.
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are authoritative?19 Declarations can be questioned, denied, contradicted,
misunderstood, ignored, and, no doubt, other things as well. But they can-
not be breached.
The situation is partly clarified by supposing that the law in question
simply confers legal validity on judicial judgments, that is, that it identifies
them as proper legal materials-as "internally" authoritative for various
legal purposes-and thus ensures them the same legal status as any other
law of the system relative to this or that person. On this understanding of
things, it follows that if a single law of a given legal system is authorita-
tive for a person, then any valid law of the system is identically authorita-
tive for that person. Moreover, it appears that the authority in question is
not merely legal but has some moral force as well, grounded as it is in an
agreement to abide by law. Of crucial importance, however, is the magni-
tude of that moral force.
Oddly, Professor Allen touches on the matter of magnitude only indi-
rectly. On his understanding of the Laws' argument against Socrates' es-
cape, the entire case turns on the proposition that Socrates could not es-
cape without, by deed, denying the legal authority of the court's
sentence."0 But it is very difficult to see why he thinks this. Why can't
Socrates acknowledge that he is a proper legal subject under Athenian law
and grant, too, that judicial judgments, including the one that sentenced
him to death, are legally valid, and nonetheless escape? His escape would
deny none of these things-unless, of course, one supposes that the agree-
19. The Laws assert: "A good deal might be said, especially by an orator, in behalf of that
law, now to be broken, which requires that judgments judicially rendered be authoritative." P.
123 (quoting PLATO, CRITO, line 50 (b-c)).
20. P. 84. This crucial matter might be clarified by two further points. First, Socrates
might have argued as follows: "I must never do wrong. It is wrong not to keep just agree-
ments. I have entered into a just agreement to abide by the laws. The court's order sentencing
me to death is a lawful order. To escape would violate this law, and would thus be wrong.
Hence, I must not escape." Socrates might have argued this way, but he did not. Rather, he
assented to the Laws' contention that his escape would implicate him in the destruction of the
Laws, so far as that lay in his power. But how this could be is the central question of the
Crito, or so Professor Allen contends.
Second, Professor Allen's answer refers us to what he claims is Socrates' novel understand-
ing of legal authority. Unfortunately, it seems that Professor Allen's reconstruction of the ar-
gument set out in the text (the one whose conclusion is that Socrates' escape would implicate
him in a rejection of law) employs the new notion of authority without ever fully explaining or
justifying it. Thus, if the idea of legal authority consists of nothing more than (1) an agreement
to abide by law, and (2) a valid legal directive applied to someone who falls under the scope or
jurisdiction of Athens' law, it is not clear just how the satisfaction of these conditions is sup-
posed to establish that Socrates' escape would involve him in "deny[ing] the [legal] authority of
[his] sentence," p. 84. There must be, one supposes, something special about thd nature of law
or legal authority, something not deducible merely from the possible stringency of agreements,
that explains what is going on here. Thus, if the (supposed) moral conclusiveness of (just)
agreements were doing the work, it would follow immediately that Professor Allen's account
(in terms of the destruction of law) would be otiose. But, absent this assumption, it seems, at
this point in Professor Allen's discussion, that Socrates could consistently acknowledge the legal
authority of the court's sentence and deny only its moral conclusiveness.
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ment that brought him under Athenian law entails, straightaway, that he
is absolutely obliged to obey all (just) laws. But if the agreement is au-
thoritative in this way, that is, if it is morally conclusive on the issue of
escape, then the Laws' reference to their own threatened destruction is
simply superfluous. And, if this is right, Professor Allen's attempt to show
that the agreement to abide by law is only a necessary, and not the most
important, component of the Laws' argument against Socrates' escape
fails.
To avoid this outcome it seems necessary to suppose, then, that the
moral force of the agreement to abide by law is not alone conclusive on
the issue of escape. But now we are returned to where we began. If the
agreement is not conclusive, why would Socrates' escape involve him in
denying the legal authority of the sentence against him? Why couldn't he
acknowledge the legal authority, but deny that that authority is morally
conclusive on the issue at hand? But if this is right, then Professor Allen's
interpretation of the Laws' argument again fails, for unless Socrates' es-
cape would involve him in denying the legal authority of the court's sen-
tence, the claimed link between this denial and the denial of all such di-
rectives would be broken. And without that link the grounds for thinking
that his escape would be tantamount to destroying the Laws would be
completely undercut.
To understand Professor Allen's interpretation correctly, it appears to
be absolutely essential to bear in mind that it is the Laws that are speak-
ing. It is they who claim that Socrates' escape would involve him in deny-
ing the court's authority, and from their perspective, it is not utterly
unintelligible that the matter should so appear. From their point of view,
whatever is legally authoritative in a given case is conclusive or absolutely
determinative as regards their actions. For the Laws, if Socrates' sentence
is legally valid and if it pertains, as it does, to a proper legal subject, it is
legally authoritative. And plainly this is conclusive on the Laws' behavior.
Barring, possibly, cases involving incompatible valid directives, the Laws
cannot have a reason not to act in accordance with a legally authoritative
standard. The Laws' reasons for acting as they do are always exclusively
legal in nature. It follows that for the Laws to reject any valid order
would be tantamount to rejecting all such orders. Validity, as indicated
above, attaches to a source of directives. 2' Hence, it is impossible to reject
the validity of a single directive from a designated source without rejecting
21. See pp. 85, 110. It is this pedigree aspect of the notion of validity, see R. DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 17 (1977), not any principle of universalization, that explains the
move from "this" to "all." Professor Allen cites, instead, a universalization argument that he
says is to be "found nowhere else in ancient philosophy," p. 85. Alas, it is not to be found in
the text either, nor, apparently, is it necessary.
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the validity of all directives having that source. Finally, where the direc-
tives in question pertain, as in Socrates' case, to the application of law,
their denial is tantamount to the rejection of law altogether, for law with-
out application is impossible.
This, it appears, is the argument Professor Allen means to attribute to
the Laws. Insofar as it is understood as an argument internal to the Laws,
it is, perhaps, unexceptionable. But since Socrates is a moral agent, not a
legal system, the argument seems to have no force against him. Unlike the
Laws, Socrates can have good and compelling reasons not to act in accor-
dance with a pertinent, legally authoritative directive, since unlike the
Laws (and without their approval) he has both a right and a duty to look
beyond the law to morality. It follows that he, unlike the Laws, can act
contrary to the legal sentence against him without denying the authority
of the court's sentence, because that directive is not necessarily conclusive
on what he (as opposed to the Laws) ought to do.
Professor Allen refers to the Laws' argument as involving a "trick of
perspective, 22 but it is not clear whether he thinks the argument is a good
one or not, a piece of chicanery or a real insight. A principle of charity
requires that he be given the benefit of any doubt, but there is some doubt.
Thus, assuming he thought Socrates accepted a weak argument, there
surely is some obligation to explain Socrates' gullibility in this important
matter. That Professor Allen is silent on the point is some evidence he is
unaware of the difficulty.
What might explain Socrates' susceptibility to the argument Professor
Allen has identified? Three considerations come to mind. First, Socrates
quite clearly conceived of the relationship between citizens and the Laws
as a moral one, not essentially a matter of force. So, at the outset, there
exists a certain pressure in favor of according some moral status to the law
collectively considered. Second, as the argument laid out by Professor Al-
len shows, law has its own "internal" logic that is conclusive on its opera-
tions. But "conclusiveness on action" (on what ought to be done) is com-
monly thought to be a central aspect of "the moral," certainly for moral
agents. Thus, if morally speaking one ought to do X, then, all things con-
sidered, X is what one ought to do.23 By a parity of reasoning, one might
think that what is conclusive on legal action is an aspect of the law's
morality." Finally, bringing these several considerations together is a
principle fundamental to Socrates' thought, namely, some version of what
22. Pp. 86, 111.
23. The so-called Socratic paradoxes all apparently presuppose some version of this princi-
ple and this view about the connection between morality and action.
24. For the suggestion that law itself might be said to have a morality, see L. FULLER,
THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969).
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might be termed the Unity of Practical Reason-a commitment to the idea
that the set of conclusive or finally compelling reasons for action is a con-
sistent set. From these points it would appear to follow that what is
finally conclusive for the Laws and what is finally conclusive for Socrates
cannot finally be incompatible, as they would be if it were both right for
the Laws to execute Socrates and for Socrates to escape. Since "law logic"
affords the Laws no choice in the matter, it is up to Socrates, who is
required only to suffer, not to perform, an injustice, 2 to make the re-
quired accommodation and not escape.
Whatever Professor Allen means to say about the force of the Laws'
argument, he must be congratulated for bringing to light an interpretation
that is sufficiently beguiling to explain how even Socrates might have been
taken in by it. There are not many plausible alternatives. The best of
them, variations on pure agreement theory, saddle Socrates with an em-
barrassing moral absolutism regarding the bindingness of (just) agree-
ments; they either ignore, as mere hyperbole, the Laws' opening remarks
about their threatened destruction, or they wrongly suppose that somehow
this readily follows from the bare fact of the agreement to abide by law.
There are, then, strong indirect incentives to accept Professor Allen's inge-
nious proposal.
II. Legality, Meaning, and Philosophy in the Apology
The Apology also has lessons to teach from the perspective of legal the-
ory, or so the author implies. The most important is the way that the
vagueness of the term "impiety" contaminates the entire case against Soc-
rates, reducing the trial to a mere mockery of legality. Because of this
vagueness, the charge fails to provide a "legal standard which ascertaina-
ble fact could be adduced to support or refute ... ." In the absence of
such a standard there exists a pressing danger that one will be tried for
one's reputation rather than for specific conduct. It is certain that Socrates
was aware of this possibility, since in his defense he sharply distinguished
between his old accusers and the instigators of the "current" action. The
author worries that in a case like this "innocence and guilt lose precise
meaning, as does proof,"27 and he maintains that the reason Socrates did
not really deny the charges against him "is because he could not." 8 They
25. Professor Allen maintains that the Laws' speech, and Socrates' position, finally turn on
what he calls "the primacy of justice." P. 82. In fact, it is really the principle of not doing
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were just too vague.
Much of what Professor Allen objects to here is, of course, objectiona-
ble, but several important caveats must be entered. First, most if not all of
these objections are from the perspective of Anglo-American, not Attic,
jurisprudence and so should not be read as points Socrates might reasona-
bly have raised in opposition to procedural practices governing his trial.
Second, some of these alleged failings in legality may have been partially
cured by other facets of Athenian trials, the large juries, for example. And
third, to emphasize the matter of vagueness as strongly as Professor Allen
does undermines Socrates' seeming certitude that his case was not decided
correctly. If the charge against him was so vague that he couldn't defend
himself, how could he confidently contend that the jury returned the
wrong verdict?
Professor Allen is surely right to worry about the meaning of "impi-
ety," but the central problem here (the crux of the trial from Socrates'
point of view) is something more akin to ambiguity than to vagueness.
Vagueness occurs at a term's boundaries, in the penumbra of its meaning.
Doubtless, "impiety" is vague. In many cases it would be impossible, as a
matter of meaning, to say whether someone had been impious or not. But
not in Socrates' case, surely. For by "impiety" Athens apparently, if only
vaguely, meant something like "failing to show due deference to the gods,
idols, and sacred occasions acknowledged or celebrated by the City." And,
on this understanding of "impiety," who could seriously doubt that Socra-
tes was impious? Who could seriously hold that his conviction was an
"injustice," that his case was not decided correctly, relative to this inter-
pretation of the crucial term? Vague as this term is, it is not that vague.
A more plausible story is as follows. At his trial (and before, as the
Euthyphro indicates), Socrates was hard at work introducing Athens to a
new notion of piety. He sought to move his countrymen away from a
largely conventional and behavioristic understanding and in the direction
of a formal and genuinely normative replacement. Piety, he seems to have
been suggesting, is properly understood as fidelity to standards of right
conduct, whatever one conscientiously supposes those to be. This "sugges-
tion" is not weak and wan, only dimly discernible in the text. Rather, it is
everywhere in the Apology, once Socrates has answered, as well as he
could, the problem posed by his "old accusers." Immediately following
Socrates' answer, Meletus is asked to clarify his accusation.2 9 Strangely,
Meletus changes the charge from "Socrates loves gods other than those
acknowledged by the City" to "Socrates loves no gods at all," that is, athe-
29. P. 47 (quoting PLATO, Apology, line 26(b-c)).
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ism." One might dismiss this remarkable revision as mere stage-setting
for the show to come; it could be an indication that Meletus is not master
of the accusation he has made, that he is, in fact, neither serious nor sin-
cere. But from this point on, almost the entire argument of the Apology is
aimed at rehearsing Socrates' steadfastness to doing his duty, to obeying
his superiors (be they god, State, or another person), to what he took to be
the requirements of right conduct. Evidently, Socrates thought that if he
could persuade his jurors that he had been steadfastly dutiful throughout
his life, he would have established that he had not acted impiously. Of
course, for this showing to have succeeded, the jurors would have had to
succumb, no doubt unwittingly, to Socrates' exquisitely subtle, even sur-
reptitious, effort to induce a conceptual revision regarding the idea of
piety. There was little hope that he would succeed, but as a pious person,
he had no choice but to try.
This interpretation of the Apology brings to light what is surely the
most poignant of the many ironies to be found there,3 namely, Socrates'
using the occasion of his trial to teach, to improve his countrymen, to
instruct them on the true meaning of piety, to propose to them a certain
conceptual revision, and thus to stand before his accusers and do what
worried them most about him-philosophize. But more importantly, per-
haps, this reading explains how Socrates might seriously maintain that his
conviction was unjust as distinct from a mere error in evaluating the evi-
dence he had adduced. A fatal mishandling of the facts might result in
what, colloquially, could be termed a "miscarriage of justice," but surely
this just means a failure in legal justice. Socrates, though, had something
else in mind-a kind of moral, not merely casuistical or computational,
wrong. What could it be?
Socrates himself referred to it as the jurors' "failure to decide the case
correctly." But what does that mean? One thing it suggests is that Socra-
tes did not object to a law proscribing impiety. But if he did not take
exception to the law itself, then it seems that the only alternative would be
to object to the jurors' handling of the facts. The jury must have mis-
weighed them or drawn faulty inferences, prejudicial to Socrates.3 2 But
there is another possibility, almost hidden from our twentieth-century
view because of our sharp distinction between questions of law and ques-
tions of fact. According to Anglo-American jurisprudence, courts settle the
first kind of question; juries decide only questions of fact. But Attic jurors
30. Id. (quoting PLATO, Apology, line 26(c)).
31. Others are elegantly teased from the text by Professor Allen. See pp. 3-16.
32. This reading is greatly encouraged by the Laws' concluding remark that if Socrates
"departs" by execution, he will be the "victim of injustice at the hands of men, not at the
hands of we who are the Laws." P. 127 (quoting PLATO, Crito, line 54 (c)).
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did it all. Not only did they hear and evaluate evidence, they also deter-
mined how the law should be interpreted. It follows that the supposed
injustice against Socrates might well have been, not a mistake in evalua-
tion, but a misinterpretation of the law against impiety, measured, of
course, against the new meaning of "piety" that Socrates' efforts (alas, in
vain) had been designed to promote. On this view of things, we can as-
sume that the jurors did not follow Meletus in his apparent slide from
"impiety" to "atheism" and that they held Socrates accountable to the
traditional, and conventional, requirements of piety. But, on Socrates'
view, this would be tantamount to holding him accountable to an immoral
standard. Understandably, he might have regarded this as a grave moral
(not legal) wrong-indeed, as an injustice.
Conclusion
Many other things might be said about Professor Allen's book. It in-
cludes his new translations of the Apology and the Crito, "not because the
world is groaning for them," but "as an aid to the reader and a control on
interpretation;"33 the discussion of irony and rhetoric in the Apology is a
pleasure to read; and woven throughout the book is a haunting descant
noting problems with legal realism, problems that Socrates' views about
law, inchoate as they were, deftly avoid.
Despite Professor Allen's ingenious efforts, some readers will continue
to doubt his claim that the Crito is "one of the great masterpieces in legal
philosophy." 4 But the success of Socrates and Legal Obligation does not
turn on this point. The test, as always, is whether the book stimulates
thought. This book does, abundantly.
33. P. ix.
34. P. viii.
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